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The present study investigated the consciousness-control relationship by suppressing the
possibility to exert executive control on incidentally acquired knowledge. Participants first
learned a sequence of locations through a serial reaction time (SRT) task. Next, to assess
the extent to which the incidentally acquired knowledge was available to executive control,
they were asked both to generate the learned sequence under inclusion instructions, and
then to avoid the generation of the learned sequence under exclusion instructions. We
manipulated the possibility for participants to recruit control processes in the generation
task in three different conditions. In addition to a control condition, participants generated
sequences under inclusion and exclusion concurrently with either articulatory suppression
or foot tapping. In a final recognition task, participants reacted to old vs. new short
sequences (triplets), and judged, for each sequence, whether it had been presented
before or not. Results suggest that articulatory suppression specifically impairs exclusion
performance by interfering with inner speech. Because participants were nevertheless
able to successfully recognize fragments of the training sequence in the recognition
task, this is indicative of a dissociation between control and recognition memory. In
other words, this study suggests that executive control and consciousness might not be
associated in all circumstances.
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Executive control and consciousness are typically assumed to be
associated (see Moors and De Houwer, 2006; Hommel, 2007 for
reviews): one can only control the knowledge that one is aware
of. Dehaene and colleagues “neural workspace” hypothesis, for
instance, explicitly rules out the possibility that an unconscious
process can modulate high-level, conscious processes (Dehaene
and Changeux, 2004). However, evidence that executive control
is possible in the absence of awareness has recently been obtained
with masked priming (Heinemann et al., 2009; van Gaal et al.,
2009; Kiefer and Martens, 2010; Capa et al., 2011).
Using a different method, the present study aimed at assessing
whether knowledge that one cannot control nevertheless remains
available to awareness. Participants first learned a sequence of
locations through a serial reaction time (SRT) task (Nissen and
Bullemer, 1987). Next, to assess the extent to which the inciden-
tally acquired knowledge was available to executive control, they
were asked both to generate the learned sequence under inclu-
sion instructions, and then to avoid the generation of the learned
sequence under exclusion instructions. Comparing the knowl-
edge produced when people are directly instructed to recall it
and when they are directly instructed to avoid its recall makes
it possible to assess the extent to which people are able to con-
trol the influence of the acquired knowledge (Destrebecqz and
Cleeremans, 2001; Wilkinson and Shanks, 2004). Finally a direct
recognition task assessed awareness of the material. Crucially,
people’s ability to control the expression of the learned knowledge
was manipulated by asking participants to perform a secondary
task during generation. Thus, in addition to a control condition,
participants generated sequences under inclusion and exclusion
instructions concurrently with either articulatory suppression or
foot tapping. The rationale behind this manipulation stems from
the well-established relationship between language, inner speech,
and cognitive control. Cragg and Nation (2010) recently surveyed
the studies showing a parallel development of language abili-
ties and cognitive control. Indeed, after the seminal “Thought
and language” book by Vygotsky (1962), there is no doubt that
language plays a role in guiding children’s own thinking and
behavior. However, the exact implication of inner speech in cog-
nitive control continues to be debated. Cragg and Nation (2010)
suggest that language may be implicated in selecting and acti-
vating the relevant task set, in keeping track of the task (or
item) order, and in retrieving the relevant task goal, especially
when conflicting information is present. In the following, we
briefly review evidence that suppressing inner speech is indeed
detrimental to controlled processes.
SUPPRESSING INNER SPEECH AS A MEANS OF
INTERFERINGWITH EXECUTIVE CONTROL
One of the foremost methods to study the role of inner speech
in higher-level cognition consists of “relatively simple articula-
tory interference procedures” (de Guerrero, 2005, p. 108). For
example, in seeking to induce perseverative errors in healthy par-
ticipants and compare their performance with frontal patients,
Dunbar and Sussman (1995) administered the Wisconsin Card
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Sorting Test (WCST) concurrently with either an articulatory
suppression or a tone detection secondary task. They observed
more perseverative errors when a category is changed for the
first time, in the articulatory suppression condition only. In other
words, perseverative errors can be induced in theWCST by block-
ing inner speech, because participants loose track of the task rules.
Concurrent articulatory suppression has also been extensively
used to hinder task preparation in the task-switching paradigm.
In such studies, participants complete or verify lists of addition
and subtraction problems, or perform parity, magnitude, let-
ter, color, or shape judgments in blocked vs. alternating form
(Baddeley et al., 2001; Emerson and Miyake, 2003; Miyake et al.,
2004; Saeki and Saito, 2004, 2009; Bryck and Mayr, 2005; Saeki
et al., 2006). Concurrently, they have to perform an articulatory
suppression task, which may consist in reciting the days of the
week or the months of the year (Baddeley et al., 2001), in saying
“the” or “da” repeatedly (Baddeley et al., 2001; Saeki and Saito,
2004, 2009; Bryck and Mayr, 2005; Saeki et al., 2006), in saying
the sequence “a–b–c” repeatedly (Emerson and Miyake, 2003)
or in repeating “Tuesday” or “Thursday” (Miyake et al., 2004).
Articulatory suppression is typically contrasted with a non-verbal
secondary task, such as foot tapping, and with a control con-
dition without any secondary task at all. Overall, data indicate
that disrupting inner speech via articulatory suppression specif-
ically impairs task-switching performance, above and beyond the
detrimental effects imposed by the requirement to perform a
dual task.
Articulatory suppression also makes it difficult to over-
ride prepotent responses. For instance, blocking inner speech
(“inner voice”) increases impulsive responding in a Go/No-Go
task (Tullett and Inzlicht, 2010). Participants make more “Go”
responses when they say the word “computer” repeatedly than
when they continuously draw circles with their non-dominant
hand. This is even more so in a switching version of the Go/No-
Go task, which requires more self-control. As a consequence,
Tullett and Inzlicht (2010) insist on the specific role that verbal
resources play in self-control.
It is worth noting that research related to the interplay between
language development and the development of action control also
points in the same direction. More specifically, Karbach et al.
(2011) demonstrated the positive influence of verbal relevant
self-instructions for action-effect learning in 4-year-old children.
In the same vein, Kray et al. (2008) provided evidence that the
deficits in task-switching ability usually observed in younger chil-
dren and older adults can be counteracted by verbal labelling.
The action control benefits associated with verbalization appear
to follow a U-shaped developmental trend across the lifespan.
Importantly, regardless of the apparent procedural differences
and the specific goals of each study, the general conclusion arising
from all these data is that disturbing inner speech has detrimental
effects on executive control processes. In this light, inner speech
thus serves as an internal self-cuing device that is particularly
helpful when endogenous control is required. In other words,
inner speech helps drive action in complex situations where infor-
mation from the immediate past is needed. Building on this
conclusion, the present study addresses the question of the rela-
tionship between consciousness and control by suppressing the
possibility of exerting executive control on knowledge in implicit
sequence learning.
Implicit sequence learning is the ability to learn sequential reg-
ularities without intending to learn (see Perruchet, 2008; Shanks,
2010). In a typical SRT task (Nissen and Bullemer, 1987), a visual
target moves from location to location following a fixed sequence.
The task is presented as a speed test in which participants have to
track the target by pressing the corresponding keys as fast as pos-
sible. The absence of instructions regarding the existence of an
underlying sequence makes it unlikely that participants develop
any intention to learn its regularities. Nonetheless, they typically
show increasing sensitivity to the sequential regularities contained
in the sequence as training progresses, as demonstrated by grad-
ually faster responses to predictable locations vs. novel locations
(as when the training sequence is suddenly replaced by another).
Under these circumstances, participants typically exhibit lim-
ited awareness of the sequential regularities (Cleeremans et al.,
1998), and sequence learning therefore constitutes an excellent
example of implicit learning. Here, at the end of the SRT task,
people performed two forced-choice tasks, as in Destrebecqz and
Cleeremans (2001). Participants first performed a generation task
in which they had to freely generate a sequence under inclusion
and exclusion instructions. In a final recognition task, partici-
pants were asked to react to old vs. new short sequences (triplets),
and to decide, for each sequence, whether it had been presented
before or not.
AIMS AND HYPOTHESIS OF THE PRESENT STUDY
The generation task is of particular interest here because it
requires executive control. The specific version of the genera-
tion task we used here is based on Destrebecqz and Cleeremans
(2001) and includes two phases. Participants first perform the
generation task under inclusion instructions. They are asked to
generate a sequence that resembles the training sequence as much
as possible. Next, they perform the generation task under exclu-
sion instructions, that is, they are asked to avoid reproducing the
training sequence (that is, to generate a sequence that is as dif-
ferent as possible from the trained sequence). According to the
Process Dissociation Procedure (Jacoby, 1991), generation under
inclusion instructions constitute a facilitation task because both
explicit and implicit knowledge may help participants generate
the training sequence. In contrast, generation under exclusion
instructions is an interference task because explicit and implicit
knowledge of the repetitive pattern act in opposition: Only con-
scious, controlled knowledge can help participants avoid produc-
ing the training pattern. Thus, observing that fragments of the
trained sequence are generated under exclusion instructions can
only reflect lack of control.
Based on existing evidence that inner speech supports exec-
utive control processes, we assumed that it plays a specific self-
cuing role in the generation task. Specifically, we assumed (based
on informal interviews) that most participants verbally recode the
material and use such verbal codes to organize their memory of
the sequence and drive their generation responses, particularly
under the difficult exclusion instructions. Thus, if this assump-
tion is correct and that inner speech is indeed involved during
generation, then blocking inner speech (through a concurrent
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articulatory suppression task) should make it particularly diffi-
cult for participants to override the tendency to generate training
triplets under exclusion instructions. Articulatory suppression
should not have such a strong influence under inclusion instruc-
tions, however, because generating the trained sequence can also
be supported by implicit, automatic processes that do not depend
so much on inner speech.
To sum up, the present study aims at disrupting executive con-
trol processes in the generation phase of an incidental sequence
learning task. All participants were exposed in the same man-
ner to the training sequence during the SRT task, and should
thus all have learned the sequential regularities of the material
to the same extent. They then performed the generation task
(under both inclusion and exclusion instructions) in three dif-
ferent conditions: with concurrent articulatory suppression, with
foot tapping, or without any secondary task. We predicted that
articulatory suppression would specifically impair exclusion per-
formance, in that participants should generate more elements
from the training sequence in this condition, as compared to
the control and foot tapping conditions. Finally, since all partici-
pants underwent the same recognition task as the final test of the
study, we expected them to perform similarly in being able to dif-
ferentiate between old and new sequential fragments. Observing
a dissociation between generation and recognition performance
in the articulatory suppression group would suggest that partici-
pants had acquired at least some conscious sequential knowledge




Fifty-seven students aged 18–26 years from the Université Libre
de Bruxelles received course-credits for taking part in the exper-
iment. They were all unfamiliar with the SRT task. Nineteen of
them were randomly assigned to each of three different con-
ditions: articulatory suppression, foot tapping, and control. All
participants had normal or corrected sight.
PROCEDURE AND MATERIAL
The experiment consisted in an SRT task, followed by the gener-
ation and recognition tasks. The SRT and recognition tasks were
identical in all conditions, whereas the generation task differed
according to the experimental conditions (articulatory suppres-
sion, foot tapping, and control). The display consisted of four dots
arranged horizontally on the computer screen and separated by
intervals of 3 cm. The stimulus was a small black circle 0.4 cm in
diameter that appeared on a white background, centered 0.4 cm
below one of the four dots. Each screen position corresponded to
a key on the computer keyboard. The spatial configuration of the
keys was fully compatible with the screen positions.
Participants performed a serial four-choice reaction time task
during 15 training blocks of 96 trials, for a total of 1440 trials.
On each trial, a stimulus appeared at one of the four possible
screen locations. Participants were instructed to respond as fast
and as accurately as possible by pressing on the corresponding
key with the index and middle finger of each hand. Each block
of trials began at a different point in the sequence. The target
was removed as soon as a key had been pressed, and the next
stimulus appeared after a 250ms interval (i.e., RSI = 250ms).
Erroneous responses were signaled by means of a tone. Short
rest breaks occurred between any two experimental blocks. Two
second order conditional sequences (SOC1 = 342312143241 and
SOC2= 341243142132) were used in the SRT task. In each group,
half of the subjects were trained on SOC1 during the first 13
blocks and during block 15; and on SOC2 during block 14 (that is,
the transfer block). In this case, we will consider SOC1 as “own”
sequence and SOC2 as “other” sequence. This design was reversed
for the other half of the subjects. At the end of the SRT task, par-
ticipants were informed that the dots had followed a repeating
pattern. The two direct tests were then administered.
First, participants performed a generation task under inclusion
and exclusion instructions (Destrebecqz and Cleeremans, 2001).
A single stimulus appeared in a random location. Participants
under inclusion instructions were required to generate a sequence
that resembled the training sequence as much as possible.
Subsequently, participants under exclusion instructions were
required to generate another sequence (i.e., to try to avoid repro-
ducing the sequential regularities of the training sequences).
In both generation tasks, participants were also told not to
repeat responses. The stimulus moved whenever participants had
pressed one of the keys, and appeared at the corresponding loca-
tion after a 250ms RSI. In all conditions, a metronome was
set to beat at the rate of 80 beats per min (i.e., one beat every
750ms). Groups differed during the generation task: two groups
of participants performed the task with a concurrent articulatory
suppression or foot tapping secondary task, whereas the control
group performed the generation task alone. The experimenter
first described the secondary task and demonstrated how to per-
form it. Participants were instructed to say “ba-ba-ba” repeatedly
once per metronome beat in the articulatory suppression con-
dition, or to tap their dominant foot once per beat in the foot
tapping condition. After receiving these instructions and watch-
ing the demonstration, participants practiced the secondary task
to ensure that the task requirements were clear and that they
could perform the task correctly. Then they performed the gen-
eration task (both under inclusion and exclusion instructions) in
combination with the appropriate secondary task. Performance
in the foot tapping and articulatory suppression tasks was closely
monitored by the experimenter, who reminded the participants
to keep up with the metronome when necessary. The proce-
dure for the control condition was the same as that used for
the two secondary task conditions, except that there was no sec-
ondary task to perform concurrently with the generation task.
The metronome was nevertheless operating in this condition so
as to equate the level of external noise to that in the two dual-
task conditions. Generation scores were computed as the number
of “own”, “other,” and “neither” triplets generated under inclu-
sion and exclusion instructions separately. An “own” triplet is a
triplet that was part of the training sequence; an “other” triplet is
a triplet that was part of the transfer sequence; a “neither” triplet
is a triplet that was neither “own” nor “other”. The maximum
number of “own” or “other” triplets was 96.
Finally, participants performed a triplets recognition task,
as in Shanks and Johnstone (1999). Participants reacted to
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24 fragments of three trials. Twelve were part of SOC1 and 12
were part of SOC2. Participants were asked to respond to stimuli
as in the SRT task, and then to provide a rating of how confident
they were that the fragment was part of the training sequence.
Ratings involved a six points scale where 1 = “I am certain that
this fragment was part of the training sequence” and 6 = “I am
certain that this fragment was not part of the training sequence”.
It was emphasized to participants that they had to respond as fast
as possible to the stimuli. Both ratings and reaction times were
recorded.
RESULTS
Prior to each analysis of variance (ANOVA), data were tested
with Mauchly’s test of sphericity. Where sphericity was of
concern, the degrees of freedom were modified with the
Greenhouse-Geisser epsilon and effects are reported significant
according to the adjusted alpha level. The data from one par-
ticipant in the articulatory suppression condition was discarded
because he did not follow the instructions in the generation
task.
SERIAL REACTION TIME TASK
Participants trained with SOC1 and SOC2 were combined in all
analyses. RT analyses were conducted for correct responses across
15 blocks. RTs associated with the first two stimuli of each block
were excluded, because their locations could not be predicted.
Mean error rate was very low (less than 5% of the trials) and
did not vary between conditions (F < 1, p > 0.5). Errors are not
discussed further.
Figure 1 shows the average RTs obtained over the entire exper-
iment, plotted separately for the three generation conditions
(as a reminder, all participants performed the SRT task under
the exact same conditions). A first ANOVA with blocks 1–13
as a within-subjects variable and condition (articulatory sup-
pression, foot tapping, and control) as a between-subjects vari-
able only revealed a significant effect of block, [F(4.83, 256.22) =
15.99, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.23]. There was no effect of condi-
tion, and no blocks × condition interaction (Fs < 1, ps > 0.5).
As can be seen on Figure 1, this suggests that the overall RTs
decrease with practice—from 461.25ms (SD = 88.67) in the first
six blocks down to 432.99ms (SD = 78.61) in the last seven
blocks. As expected, this decrease does not differ between groups.
More importantly, the transfer effect, as induced by the pre-
sentation of a different sequence on block 14, gives an indirect
index of sequence learning. An ANOVA with transfer (block
14 vs. the mean of blocks 13 and 15) as within-subjects vari-
able and condition (articulatory suppression, foot tapping, and
control) as between-subjects variable yielded a significant effect
of transfer, [F(1, 53) = 151.97, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.74]. Overall,
reaction times increased by 65.86ms (SD = 5.29) when the train-
ing (own) sequence was changed to another sequence in block
14. As in the previous analysis and as expected, there was no
effect of condition, and no transfer × condition interaction
(Fs < 1, ps > 0.4).
This suggests (1) that RTs increased significantly in the three
conditions when the sequence was modified and (2) that this
RTs increase was of same extent in all three conditions, sug-
gesting equivalent levels of sequence learning. Taken together,
FIGURE 1 | Mean reaction times for each training block, plotted
separately for the three conditions: articulatory suppression (AS), foot
tapping (FT), and control (CTL) groups. Block 14 corresponds to the
transfer block. Recall that the experimental setting did not differ during SRT
task (data are plotted separately for clarity). Error bars represent standard
errors.
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SRT task results show that sequence learning was observed in
the three groups of participants. Indeed, the RTs decreased with
practice when the same sequence is presented to the partici-
pants, increased when the sequence was modified and decreased
again when the training sequence was put anew. We now exam-
ine whether participants differ in their ability to project their
knowledge of the sequence in generation and recognition tasks.
GENERATION TASK
Figures 2A,B show the mean number of “own”, “other,” and “nei-
ther” triplets generated under inclusion and exclusion instruc-
tions, respectively. “Neither” triplets will not be considered since
the focus of interest lies in the comparison between “own” and
“other” triplets.
We first compared the number of “own” triplets (from the
training sequence) generated under inclusion and exclusion
instructions in the three conditions. An ANOVAwith instructions
(inclusion vs. exclusion) as a within-subjects variable and condi-
tions (articulatory suppression, foot tapping, and control) as a
between-subjects variable revealed a significant instruction effect,
[F(1, 53) = 11.67, p = 0.001, η2p = 0.18], indicating that overall
participants generated more “own” triplets in inclusion than in
exclusion (M = 43.05, SD = 11.58 and M = 33.55, SD = 13.39,
respectively). The main effect of condition was marginally sig-
nificant, [F(2, 53) = 3.08, p = 0.054, η2p = 0.10], suggesting that
the overall number of triplets generated varied across conditions
(M = 38.66, SD = 6.41 in the control condition, M = 35.72,
SD = 8.23 in the foot tapping condition, and M = 42.22, SD =
9.15 in the articulatory suppression condition). The instruction×
condition interaction failed to reach significance, [F(2, 53) = 1.93,
p = 0.16, η2p = 0.07]. However, the pattern of results indicates
that more “own” triplets were generated under exclusion instruc-
tions in the articulatory suppression group only. Considering
that we had a strong a priori hypothesis regarding the effect of
articulatory suppression on exclusion performance, and that the
F-value of the interaction was above 1 (see Wilcox, 1987 for
details), we carried out planned contrasts on the mean num-
ber of “own” triplets generated under inclusion and exclusion
instructions separately. As expected, inclusion performance in
the articulatory suppression group did not differ from the other
groups, t(53) = 0.61, p > 0.50. In contrast, and crucially for the
purpose of the present study, participants in the articulatory sup-
pression condition generated significantly more “own” triplets
in exclusion than participants in the control and foot tapping
conditions (M = 40.01, SD = 3.20 for articulatory suppression
condition vs.M = 31.95, SD = 2.05 for control and foot tapping
conditions taken together), t(53) = 2.17, p < 0.05.
Additional paired-samples t-tests compared the number of
“own” and “other” triplets generated under inclusion and exclu-
sion instructions for each of the three groups, hence providing
an appropriate chance level1. Participants generated significantly
more “own” than “other” triplets under inclusion instructions in
1The appropriate baseline level of performance in the generation task consists
in the comparison between “own” and “other” triplets. Indeed, the alterna-
tive “other” sequence is structurally identical to the training “own” sequence,
except that the former was trained and the latter was not (Wilkinson and
Shanks, 2004).
FIGURE 2 | (A) Mean number of triplets generated in inclusion under
articulatory suppression (AS), foot tapping (FT), and control (CTL) conditions.
“Own”, number of SOC triplets generated from the training sequence;
“other”, number of triplets from the alternate, untrained sequence; neither,
number of triplets from neither the training nor the untrained sequence.
Error bars represent standard errors. (B) Mean number of triplets
generated in exclusion under articulatory suppression (AS), foot tapping
(FT), and control (CTL) conditions. “Own”, number of SOC triplets
generated from the training sequence; “other”, number of triplets
from the alternate, untrained sequence; neither, number of triplets from
neither the training nor the untrained sequence. Error bars represent
standard errors.
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all groups, t(18) = 2.95, p < 0.01, t(18) = 2.97, p < 0.01, and
t(17) = 2.92, p = 0.01 in the control, foot tapping, and articu-
latory suppression, respectively. Thus, participants demonstrated
above-baseline sequence knowledge in the inclusion task, irre-
spective of whether they had to perform a concurrent secondary
task or not, and irrespective of the nature of the secondary task. A
different pattern of results emerges under exclusion instructions.
While a similar number of “own” and “other” triplet was gener-
ated both in the control and foot tapping conditions, all ts < |1|,
ps > 0.70, participants generated significantly more “own” than
“other” triplets (M = 40.01, SD = 3.20 vs. M = 27.72, SD =
2.77) in the articulatory suppression condition, t(17) = 2.33,
p < 0.05. This suggests that participants were specifically unable
to withhold their responses during the exclusion task when an
articulatory suppression task had to be performed concurrently.
Taken together, our data suggest that the acquired sequential
knowledge was available in a direct generation test. Above-chance
inclusion scores in all conditions indicate that participants were
able to recruit this knowledge when necessary. In exclusion, par-
ticipants demonstrated some level of control over the expression
of their knowledge, not only when they performed the task alone
in the control condition, but also when a concurrent foot-tapping
task was added. Conversely, and as predicted, a detrimental effect
of articulatory suppression was observed, above and beyond the
costs associated with the requirement of performing two tasks at
the same time.
RECOGNITION TASK
Participants were required to react to sequences of three elements
(triplets) by pressing the key corresponding to the location of the
stimulus (as in the SRT task) and to rate from 1 to 6 the extent
to which they felt these sequences were old or new (i.e., “own”
vs. “other”). Sequences with erroneous responses were excluded.
Mean recognition ratings for both types of sequence (“own” vs.
“other”) are plotted separately for the three conditions. High rat-
ings correspond to judgments of novelty and are expected for
“other” triplets, whereas low ratings correspond to judgements
of oldness and are expected for “own” triplets.
As can be seen in Figure 3, “own” and “other” triplets are over-
all correctly discriminated. An ANOVA with type of sequence
(“own” vs. “other”) as within-subjects variable and condition
(articulatory suppression, foot tapping, and control) as between-
subjects variables yielded a significant main effect of type only,
[F(1, 53) = 26.36, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.33]. Neither the main effect
of condition, nor the type × condition interaction reached
significance, F < 1 and [F(2, 53) = 1.23, p = 0.28, η2p = 0.05,
respectively]. Overall this indicates that participants were able
to differentiate between “own” and “other” triplets (M = 2.95,
SD = 0.51 and M = 3.36, SD = 0.57). More importantly, this
ability to recognize parts of the training sequence did not differ
across conditions.
DISCUSSION
Consider the familiar “Neither yes nor no” game, in which one
is repeatedly asked “Yes/No” questions under the constraint that
his/her answers should be neither “yes” nor “no”. Winning the
game requires tight executive control as one has to continuously
refrain from the strong, prepotent tendency to respond to the
questions in the familiar manner, that is, by saying either “yes”
or “no”. Inevitably, as attention wanes, one comes to the point
where one answers “without thinking about it” by producing pre-
cisely the answer that had to be avoided. Should we therefore
FIGURE 3 | Mean recognition ratings given for the 24 test
triplets, plotted separately for the three conditions: articulatory
suppression, foot tapping, and control. Low ratings (between
1 and 3) are expected for old (“own”) triplets whereas high ratings (between
4 and 6) are expected for new (“other”) triplets. Error bars represent
standard errors.
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consider this automatic, uncontrolled responding as inherently
unconscious? We do not think so. Most people indeed realize that
they failed the game immediately after having uttered the taboo
words “yes” or “no” or even while uttering them: they blush,
chuckle, say “oops,” and so on. This indicates that they were per-
fectly aware of the inadequacy of their response, but just could
not help it.
The “neither yes nor no” game is a good illustration of the phe-
nomenon we sought to explore with this study. Participants were
first incidentally trained to become sensitive to sequential regu-
larities in a SRT task. In a subsequent generation task, they were
then asked to generate these sequential regularities under inclu-
sion instructions, that is, under conditions where both automatic
and controlled processes contribute to increasing performance.
Next, participants had to carry out the same generation task, but
this time under exclusion instructions, that is, under instructions
to specifically avoid producing the learned sequential regulari-
ties. In other words, the prepotent tendency to reproduce what
they had been trained on now had to be suppressed, just as a
“yes” or “no” response has to be withheld in the game. Under
such exclusion instructions, automatic and controlled processes
thus act in opposition, for expressing automatic knowledge can-
not be refrained. In the final recognition task participants had
to discriminate between fragments that were part of the training
sequence or not. They were required to express their knowl-
edge of the sequence through a continuous scale, with build-in
confidence judgements.
Thus, the generation task under exclusion instructions and the
recognition task can be conceived as reflecting different aspects
of our ability to use knowledge: Exclusion task performance
provides an index of the extent to which such knowledge can
be controlled, while recognition task performance provides and
index of the extent to which this knowledge is consciously acces-
sible (see Gaillard et al., 2009 for a similar reasoning in aging, but
see Rünger and Frensch, 2010 for a critique of the use of direct
tests to measure consciousness). Any dissociation between per-
formance in the exclusion subtask and in the recognition task
would therefore demonstrate the absence of a systematic associ-
ation between control and consciousness. Such a dissociation is
exactly what we observed when participants performed the gen-
eration task without the possibility to rely on inner speech to help
inhibiting sequential fragments in the exclusion subtask.
Blocking inner speech thus increased impulsive responding as
in the Go/No-Go task (Tullett and Inzlicht, 2010). That is, par-
ticipants in the articulatory suppression group were not able to
withhold the tendency to reproduce the training sequence under
exclusion instructions, whereas participants in the control and
foot tapping groups demonstrated that ability. One might argue
that those between-group differences may be due to pre-existing
differences in a number of basic cognitive abilities, such as fluid
intelligence or working memory. However, such differences have
little bearing on implicit learning (Feldman et al., 1995; Unsworth
and Engle, 2005; Kaufman et al., 2010). The influence of process-
ing speed is less clear. On the one hand, Kaufman and colleagues
(2010) observed a link between processing speed and implicit
learning but they reckon that the nature of this link remains
unclear. On the other hand, small to non-existent correlations
have been shown between incidental learning measures and pro-
cessing speed (Feldman et al., 1995). Thus we are rather confident
that the specific difficulties observed in the exclusion performance
with concurrent articulation suppression do not stem from any
baseline group differences. Moreover and most crucially, this
impaired performance cannot be explained either by insufficient
knowledge of the sequence or by lack of conscious knowledge
of the sequence. Indeed, participants in the articulatory suppres-
sion group did not differ from the other groups in the incidental
learning phase. Under inclusion instructions, they also retrieved
the appropriate sequential knowledge and produced sequential
(“own”) fragments similarly to control and foot tapping partic-
ipants. In addition, they were able to make conscious (correct)
decisions about the extent to which sequential fragments were
familiar or not, just as other participants, in the recognition task.
It is important to keep in mind that the recognition scores in our
experiment did not only consist in judging whether a given triplet
was part of the training sequence, as in Yes/No binary responses,
but also required participants to indicate how confident they were
in their judgment. Thus our data suggest that conscious access
and executive control might not be always associated after all.
This conclusion is very much in line with Tzelgov’s (1997) the-
ory of automaticity, in which automaticity is characterized not by
the fact that it involves unconscious knowledge, but rather by the
fact that behavior guided by automatic knowledge has a ballistic
character, that is, that once initiated, it unfolds of its own until the
learned effect is obtained. Thus, according to Tzelgov, we are (at
least potentially) aware of most automatic behavior—it is just that
such behavior can no longer be the object of executive control.
Our results are also consistent with Cleeremans’ theory of
automaticity (Cleeremans, 2008), according to which both exec-
utive control and availability to consciousness depend on rep-
resentation quality, where quality involves graded dimensions
such as strength, stability in time, and distinctiveness, all driven
by learning mechanisms the computational objective of which
is to increase overall adaptation. Weak representations, typical
of implicit cognition (e.g., subliminal perception) are of poor
quality and hence are only weakly available to conscious aware-
ness. Such representations also do not require conscious control
for they only exert weak effects on behavior. Very strong repre-
sentations, on the other hand, are characteristic of automaticity,
and likewise do not require cognitive control in virtue of the
fact that they are adapted. The strength of such representations
makes them available to conscious awareness in a manner that
the weak representations characteristic of implicit cognition can-
not achieve. Thus, with automatic behavior, consciousness has
become optional: The knowledge is available to conscious inspec-
tion, but such conscious monitoring is not necessary for the
knowledge to drive behavior in an adapted manner. Note, how-
ever, that such adaptation can fail. For instance, it is almost
impossible for a continental pedestrian not to turn his head left-
wards when crossing a street in London, for the learned behavior
is so automatic that it can only be prevented from being trig-
gered by environmental cues with considerable effort. Likewise,
the ironic instruction “Do not think of a white bear” (Wegner
et al., 1987) is almost impossible to follow. It should be clear
that these examples of maladaptive automated behavior are the
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exception rather than the rule, however. It is also striking to note
that in all such cases, one is acutely aware of the existence of a
conflict and of our inability to overcome it.
Congruently, our data suggests that knowledge that cannot be
controlled is available to awareness. It is interesting to reflect upon
other possible patterns of dissociation between executive control
and conscious awareness. In particular, one may wonder whether
full control is possible in the absence of awareness. Intuitively,
this should be possible, since after all, it is precisely what happens
when we are behaving automatically. This pattern of dissociation
is what Dienes and Perner (2007) described as involving “COLD
control”, that is, as involving executive control without higher-
order thought (HOT, Rosenthal, 1997). In the cold control theory
of hypnosis, Dienes and Perner argue that hypnosis offers promis-
ing ways to study executive control without conscious awareness.
For instance, they report an experiment in which participants
counted six fingers on their hand, after they received the hypnotic
suggestion to forget the number “4”. Overriding the tendency to
count “1, 2, 3, 4, 5” fingers on a hand requires executive con-
trol and yet, participants deny awareness of why they counted six
fingers on their hand.
What distinguishes our approach of the consciousness-control
problem from the cold control perspective is that our partici-
pants were all fully aware during the experiment, (i.e., they were
not in any modified state of consciousness). Moreover, all our
stimuli were supraliminal, as opposed to studies exploring the
relationship between consciousness and control with subliminal
stimuli (Heinemann et al., 2009; van Gaal et al., 2009; Kiefer and
Martens, 2010; Capa et al., 2011). However, some of them could
not recruit inner speech as self-cuing aid during the generation
task. This resulted in a specific detrimental effect of articulatory
suppression, (i.e., concurrent foot tapping did not result in less
control over the sequence under exclusion instructions). This is
reminiscent of previous data obtained with the task-switching
paradigm (Emerson and Miyake, 2003; Miyake et al., 2004; Saeki
and Saito, 2004, 2009; Bryck and Mayr, 2005; Saeki et al., 2006).
The involvement of inner speech in cognitive control is further
suggested by the relationship between inner speech production
and increased activity in the left inferior frontal gyrus (LIFG),
which is similarly recruited during working memory tasks (see
Morin, 2009).
Thus our results clearly suggest that inner speech plays an
important role in the recall and control of implicitly acquired
sequence knowledge. To the best of our knowledge, only one study
investigated the role of inner speech in sequence learning (Farley
et al., 2007, Exp. 3–4). However, Farley and colleagues intended
to disrupt sequence learning itself (and not the product of learn-
ing, i.e., sequential representations) with irrelevant speech, on
the ground that irrelevant speech is detrimental to serial order
processing. Irrelevant speech lengthened reaction times in the
SRT task, but did not prevent learning of the sequence. This
is further evidence that the role inner speech plays is a spe-
cific one. Blocking inner speech is not detrimental to automatic
tasks such as sequence learning but it impairs performance in
tasks requiring endogenous control, as the generation-exclusion
subtask.
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